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Abstract: In this paper we discuss the topological properties of the European 
banking network and its evolution over time based on the BIS consolidated 
banking statistics data exploiting information from complex network analysis. Our 
conclusions are discussed in light of the soon-to-be-launched Single Supervisory 
Mechanism that takes into account, among other things, the significance of cross-
border activity as a precondition for specifying the systemically important 
European credit institutions. According to our results, the banking network of the 
EU13 economic space can be characterized as highly asymmetric with a tendency 
to create clusters based on geographic distance and cultural and social 
similarities. Additionally, the highly exposed countries are usually dependent on a 
small number of major creditors while creditor countries tend to spread their 
power over dependent countries more equally. We advocate that the presence of 
heterogeneity and asymmetry in the network and a decrease in the level of 
foreign banking across Europe could be mitigated by the introduction of SSM, and 
from this perspective it should be viewed as a positive step towards greater 
financial stability.    
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network, too-interconnected-to-fail 
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Introduction  
The financial crisis has highlighted the need for analysis of complex economic 
structures in order to assess systemic risk in a more accurate way.  
At the outset of the financial crisis in 2008 the Too-Big-Too-Fail (TBTF) concept 
rose to prominence promoting discussion of the financial institutions whose fall 
could not only bring down the entire financial system but from which consequent 
problems would cascade social costs over the real sector that would be 
significantly higher than the costs incurred by their rescue. By Bernanke (2010): 
“A too-big to fail firm is one whose size, complexity, interconnectedness, and 
critical functions are such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into liquidation, 
the rest of the financial system and the economy would face severe adverse 
consequences.” In other words, the negative externalities generated in the 
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process are large and undesirable as they affect not only the financial system but 
also the real sector. There is no clear definition of what the TBTF concept means 
(Hurley, 2010) partially due to the often vaguely defined threshold between 
institutions allowed to fail and those who are not. 
The four criteria for becoming a TBTF institution named by Bernanke (size, 
complexity, interconnectedness, critical function) are not mutually conditioned. 
Relatively small financial institutions in terms of their assets and size might 
become TBTF if serving as a financial hub for many other players in the network 
and vice versa.1 As the network analysis focuses on studying the 
interconnectedness of nodes in a network along with its characteristics we will 
prefer using the Too-Interconnected-Too-Fail (TITF) term throughout the text in 
order to stress the role of connections in systemic risk of the banking network.         
The network analysis used in this paper is, in general, able to address two types 
of questions (Allen and Babus, 2008): (1) network effects of the particular 
network structure (resilience of a network towards systemic or idiosyncratic shock 
and related contagion effects); (2) network formation as a response to the 
external or internal shocks (how links between nodes are formed and destroyed). 
The topology of a network affects its functionality and stability (Albert and 
Barabasi, 2002; Newman, 2004). Scale-free networks (i.e. networks with a power 
law distribution of degrees) are extremely vulnerable to intentional attacks on 
their hubs (Albert et al., 2000) as well as to epidemics (Barthélemy et al., 2005).  
In finance, most of the theoretical economic literature concentrates on the first 
question using network analysis to assess systemic risk and risk of contagion with 
respect to a particular network structure. The seminal paper in this area by Allen 
and Gale (2000) shows that better connected networks are more resilient to 
contagion and in the case of a completely connected structure the system is fully 
resilient to contagious effects. Gai and Kapadia (2007) develop a model of 
contagion in financial networks using literature on spreading disease in 
epidemiological literature. While greater connectivity reduces the likelihood of 
widespread default, the shocks may have a greater impact on entire system when 
they occur as in the case of less connected network. The resilience of a more 
connected network is highly dependent on shocks hitting fragile points associated 
with structural liabilities (financial hubs). On top of that, the financial system 
tends to be fragile by its very nature whereby the behavior of one agent within a 
                                      
1 The Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund defaulted in 1998. At that time 
the size of the assets approached 4 bil. USD and daily VaR was 400 mil. USD. The asset size 
for Amaranth Advisors LLC hedge fund was approximately 9 bil. USD at its peak in 2006, 
thus more than two times bigger than the LTCM fund. While the default of the Amaranth 
Advisors did not induce any response from the FED, the default of the LTCM threatened the 
stability of the entire US financial system due to the singificant interlinkages at home and 
abroad and FED was called to step in.  
No. 1/2015 
 
37 
network may induce further distress to other agents (Cifuentes et al., 2005). The 
trade-off between improvement in risk sharing (shock absorption) and threats 
posed by higher contagion effects (shock diffusion) goes hand by hand with 
increasing network interconnectedness.  
Empirically, network analysis is widely used for studying the structure of the 
domestic interbank system (Cocco et al., 2009; Furfine, 2003; Iori et al., 2008), 
global banking network (Minoiu and Reyes, 2010; Hattori and Suda, 2007), 
international financial network (Cetorelli and Peristiani, 2009; Kubelec and Sa, 
2010), global financial derivatives network (Markose, 2012) and other sectors of 
financial system. For a more detailed overview of the network analysis and its 
current stance see Allen and Babus (2008). In general, empirical studies report 
the existence of four basic features that can characterize most of the existing 
financial networks:  (1) robust yet fragile structure,2 (2) strength of weak ties,3 
(3) homophily,4 (4) small world phenomenon.5 Any of these four characteristics 
may pose a significant threat to systemic stability of any financial network and as 
such should be properly addressed by regulatory bodies. As we argue later in the 
text, the Single Supervisory Mechanism represents a tool that might help to 
mitigate some of the negative consequences of the features of the European 
banking network from the systemic risk point of view.  
This study uses network analysis for investigation of the topological structure of 
the European banking network in terms of foreign claims, thus exposure toward 
country risk. In this sense, we focus on a systematic part of the financial system 
risk. As argued in Minoiu and Reyes (2010) the analysis of gross exposures can 
be a useful indicator of the contagion potential, thus a measure of systemic risk 
while the cross-border flows of financial capital reflect liquidity conditions in 
international markets and as such can be an informative source of financial 
distress. In that sense, our study expands research done by Allen et al. (2011) 
and Schoenmaker and Wagner (2013).  
We restrict our study to national datasets for 13 countries available in the Bank 
for International Settlements database. While regulation of the banking sector in 
                                      
2 Many low-degree nodes that can be added to or removed from a network without 
disturbing the overall robustness of this network. Yet, when a hub is hit by a directed shock 
the network is fragile in a sense that the shock disseminates across the network and 
contagion spreads over.  
3 In social sciences the „strength of weak ties“ concept was firstly introduced by 
Granovetter (1973). It describes the observation that rather then strong connections the 
weak ties enable transmission of information to large number of nodes over longer 
distances.  
4 Certain attributes tend to set up clusters of nodes, i. e. agents tend to associate 
disproportionately with those having similar traits.  
5 Network paths tend to be short or get shorter due to current trends in world economy 
(globalization, internationalization, economic integration etc.).  
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the European Union is harmonized to some extent6, the supervision over the 
domestic banking sector (and financial sector) has been so far left to the 
decisions of particular member states.7 The introduction of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism will radically change this situation as part of the supervision power will 
be taken from the national supervisory bodies and transferred to the European 
central bank. As a result of the regulatory and supervisory architecture existing in 
the European Union before the outburst of the financial crisis the banking groups 
operating in various member states had been subject to different supervisory 
bodies and not supervised on an international level. As we would like to capture 
this dichotomy we focus on the country level data and not micro level data from 
individual banking institutions as some other authors do.   
Additionally, the regulatory capital charges implemented in the Basel framework 
have been so far focusing mainly on the risk related to the individual institution’s 
exposures in trading and loan books and do not take into account losses incurred 
as a result of high interconnectedness of a particular institution. On top of that, 
institutions whose fall may bring about the fall of the entire financial network 
(financial hubs, TITF banking groups etc.) are not penalized or charged in any 
other way for their incremental contribution to the risk of other institutions 
connected to them and any potential costs from network failure must be borne by 
the government and, ultimately, tax payers. Recent research tries to address this 
issue with various regulatory propositions (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2009; 
Tarashev et al., 2009; Chan-Lau, 2010 and others). While those propositions 
basically aim to regulate the single institutions, the supervisory initiatives adopted 
at the international level aim to direct the TITF issue from the top level. The 
newly created Single Supervisory Mechanism, legally binding for all member 
states, might be in this sense understood as a tool for mitigating the systemic risk 
in the highly interconnected banking network in Europe. The implications of the 
banking network structure for the Single Supervisory Mechanism will be discussed 
in the next sections of this paper.   
The key objective of this paper is to investigate the structure of the banking 
network in Europe from the network analysis perspective. The final results 
describing the characteristics of the banking network will be discussed in light of 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) introduction. We advocate that the 
presence of heterogeneity and asymmetry in the network and a decrease in the 
level of foreign banking across Europe could be mitigated by the SSM introduction 
                                      
6 Traditionally, the EU regulation of the banking sector have been predominantely in form of 
EU directives that are not legally binding untill implemented by provisions of national law. 
Some of the measures, however, do have direct regulatory impact if present in a form of 
official EU regulations. 
7 Until 2011 the Committe of European Banking Supervisors operated on the Level 3 of the 
Lamfalussy approach serving as a place for co-ordination the supervision of cross-border 
institutions, thus operating as an advisory not supervisory body.   
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and from this perspective should be viewed as a positive step towards greater 
financial stability.     
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section we present topological 
network measurements that are used to characterize the banking network of the 
EU13 economic space. The results are discussed in the second section of this 
paper. The third sections discuss the Single Supervisory Mechanism in light of our 
empirical results. Conclusions summarize our key findings.  
1 Methodology and Data  
Network analysis allows one to investigate the complex structure of various 
economic relationships among different economic agents. In our terms, the 
sovereign countries represent single economic agents that are connected to each 
other through foreign claims. Such a financial system can by visualized by a 
graph that consists from a list of nodes , where  stands for 
number of countries included into analysis, and a set of links with directed arrows 
connecting any two nodes. From the mathematical point of view, the financial 
network is represented by the  adjacency matrix , where  
indicates the existence of a link between nodes (countries)  and ,  
otherwise and with zeros on the main diagonal as the self-interactions are not 
allowed (not economically sensible).  
A weighted network allows one to attach a positive number (weight) to each 
connection in the network that typically captures the strength of interaction 
between two economic agents represented by network nodes. By the nature of 
the foreign banking claims we are able to create two weighted matrices, for 
outward investments (foreign claims) and  for inwards investments (foreign 
liabilities). Any non-zero entry  measures the share of foreign claims 
originating in country  and being transferred to country  on total financial 
assets of the financial corporations sector of country . Any non-zero entry  
measures the share of foreign liabilities in country  toward country  on total 
financial assets of the financial corporations sector of country . The matrix of 
outward investments  is transpose of the weighted matrix of inward 
investments . Mathematically, the following must hold: 
 (1) 
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1.1 Topological Measures of the Banking Network  
In our paper we deal with a complete directed weighted network. There is a 
variety of possible network characteristics that can be computed for different 
networks. The reasons behind our specific collection are discussed in the following 
text while presenting the mathematical formula for each one.    
The in-strength (out-strength) degree of a node  measures total strength of 
dependency and is given by the following expression: 
,  (2) 
Economically speaking, with the in-strength degree we measure the portion of 
domestic financial assets that is owned by foreign counterparties no matter their 
domicile. The value of the in-strength degree might vary from zero (absolute 
autarky, i. e. foreign parties do not have any claims toward domestic agents) to 
any positive number (absolute openness, i. e. the higher the number the higher 
the involvement of foreign parties in domestic financial sector).8 Conversely, the 
out-strength degree measures the absolute level of involvement of the domestic 
banking sector into the financial sector of all other network members. The value 
of the out-strength degree might vary from zero (absolute autarky, i. e. 
absolutely no involvement) to any positive number (absolute openness, i. e. the 
higher the number the higher the involvement of domestic banking sector into 
business of financial sector of other network players).9 
The weights of edges linked to a particular node can either be of the same 
magnitude or they can be heterogeneously distributed with some edges 
dominating the others. The measurement of this heterogeneity is sometimes 
called as the participation rate ratio or disparity measure, but in reality is 
nothing else as the widely used Herfindahl-Hirschmann index. Participation ratio 
                                      
8 As discussed in the next section the data collected by the BIS does not only include 
international claims but also claims made by bank offices owned by foreign investors located 
in a domestic economy denominated in domestic currency. Theoretically, the total in-
strength degree might exceed one in various extreme cases – international claims exceed 
total domestic financial assets of financial corporations or all domestic financial assets are in 
form of credit provided by the bank offices owned by foreign investors that have some 
foreing claims too, to name some of them.  
9 The proper interpretation of the out-strenght degree might be an intriguing one. Let us 
suppose that a country X ownes the only bank operating in the country Y, has no other 
international claims against country Y and no other involvement in any other network 
members‘ financial sector. The out-strength degree for that country would be 1 no matter 
the total value of the financial assets of country Y. Other network members might have 
much higher value of claims in absolute terms than  the total value of assets owned by 
country X but their out-strength degree will be lower if they invest in countries with 
relatively big domestic financial sector owned by domestic subjects.  
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close to unity indicates preferential relationships between nodes and is calculated 
as follows: 
 (3) 
Higher scores in the participation rate ratio are to be found for network nodes 
that concentrate their economic activity to smaller number of subject in terms of 
the total exposure. In our case (subjects are countries), higher score in the 
participation rate ratio points towards a preferential relationship among particular 
countries and goes hand by hand with possible clustering occurring in the 
network. Secondly, high score in the participation rate ratio might suggest 
inefficient allocation of resources of the domestic banking sector towards foreign 
partners (“do not put all eggs into one basket” rule).10    
As the existence of directed and weighted networks brings along a more 
complicated and convoluted analysis, researchers tend to symmetrize the network 
(i. e. making in undirected) and then apply standard procedures for undirected 
network analysis. However, possible symmetry of our weighted matrices  
brings also many interesting economic insights into the nature of the international 
banking relationships among European countries.   
We use the symmetry index proposed by Fagiolo (2006) in order to check for 
symmetry of a weighted matrix  to reject or confirm the hypothesis, that 
the banking sectors of the chosen EU28 member states in terms of country risk 
exposure is highly skewed. In the case of a more or less symmetric network there 
is no “master-servant” relationship present and countries are equal in their 
relative power towards each other.  
We use the „master-servant“ term without implying any negative connotations 
related to it but just to label the situation when the relative exposure of the 
domestic banking sector towards a particular foreign partner heavily exceeds 
claims of domestic subjects against a foreign partner in relative terms.  Many 
studies have confirmed the existence of positive externalities coming from the 
presence of foreign banks in the domestic banking sector. These include: increase 
in domestic competition, access to financial services, enhanced financial and 
                                      
10 In order to measure inefficiency in terms of excessive exposure of the domestic banking 
sector towards a smaller group of partners it would be necessary to compare the current 
distribution of exposures with a  theoretical optimal distribution. In line with Markowitz 
portfolio theory measurements of country risk (e. g. country rating) and return (e. g. 
government bond interest rate) should be included. This we leave for a future research.    
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economic performance that all lead to greater financial stability (Claessens and 
van Horen, 2012). However, since the onset of the financial crisis possible 
negative consequences of foreign banking for domestic banking sector have often 
been discussed. By de Haas et al. (2011) and Popov and Udell (2010) shows that 
a decrease in lending due to the crisis in emerging European countries by foreign 
subsidiaries was higher than that by domestically owned banks. Countries with 
high relative exposure towards foreign banking institutions might consequently 
suffer a much higher drop in banking operations than those without it. As always, 
the costs might exceed the benefits even in international banking and we should 
ask where the threshold lies.11      
The symmetry index of the directed matrix  is calculated in the following 
way: 
 (4) 
where the  for EU28 member states,  is given by the expression 
,  is given by the 
expression . 
The value of the non-standardized symmetry index  used in [1] is 
calculated in the following way: 
 (5) 
where  is given by the square of the Frobenius (or Hilber-Schmidt) 
norm calculated as   . 
                                      
11 For a deeper discussion regarding the costs and benefits of international banking and 
computation of a possible threshold see Schoenmaker and Wagner (2013). 
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In general, if the , then the network can be considered as the 
undirected one and the analysis of the undirected weighted network can be 
applied and vice versa.12   
After testing for the symmetry of a network we compute the difference between 
out-and in-strength degree of a link  to capture the strength of the “master-
servant” relationship. For the measurement of the dependency between foreign 
and domestic banking sector in general we will calculate the dependency 
measure in the following way: 
 (6) 
The value of the dependency measure is always positive with no upper bound, 
thus it is not be possible, per se, to say what direction does the “master-servant” 
relationship take, only to confirm its existence. By computation of the 
dependency measure we finally create a weighted undirected network serving as 
an illustration of the distribution of power across European banking network.  
1.2 Dataset Description 
The dataset used in our analysis spans from year 2007 to the end of 2012 and 
observations are collected on yearly basis. Data are taken from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) database for consolidated banking statistics on 
bilateral basis for 13 member states of the European Union for which we have 
complete data on bilateral foreign claim linkages.13,14   
 
  
                                      
12 This rule is used in Fagiolo (2007) and represents the situation when the value of the 
standardized symmetry index , i.e. is lower than the mean of the normal 
distribution from which the  is taken. In general, one can set the threshold to 
be any real number  and conclude that the graph is undirected if  and vice 
versa.  
13 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.  
14 The BIS statistics provides data on foreign claims provided by 25 reporting countries from 
which only 13 countries belong to the EU28 economic region. Even though the creation of 
the bilateral matrix for 28 EU member state would be in theory possible the matrix would be 
incomplete. The paper by Allen et al. (2011, p.63) replaces the missing values for the rest 
of the 15 countries by zeros stating that: “Finland and Luxembourg, (…), as well as the new 
member states do not have any large banks that do sizeable business abroad.” We do not 
follow their approach for the sake of data consistency.       
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Figure 1 Structure of the BIS consolidated banking statistics data 
 
Source: Author's visualization 
According to the BIS guidelines for reporting the BIS international banking 
statistics (BIS, 2014, p. 54), the foreign claims are defined as: “financial claims 
on residents of countries other than the reporting country, i. e. claims on non-
residents of the reporting country. In the consolidated banking statistic, foreign 
claims are calculated as the sum of cross-border claims and local claims (in all 
currencies) of reporting banks’ foreign affiliates, or equivalently of international 
claims and local claims denominated in local currencies.” In comparison, the 
international claims are defined as (BIS, 2014, p. 55): “sum of cross-border 
claims in any currency and local claims of foreign affiliates denominated in non-
local currencies.” As we focus on exposure of domestic (reporting) banking sector 
to total country risk we will take data on foreign claims that includes both 
domestic as well as foreign claims of foreign affiliates of domestic banking sector. 
To illustrate the structure of the BIS consolidated banking statistics see Figure 1. 
The total foreign claims of a reporting country against the receiving country will 
be divided by the total financial assets of the financial corporations15 sector on a 
consolidated basis as reported by the Eurostat in local currency converted to the 
                                      
15 By the definition provided by Eurostat the financial corporations sector comprises all 
private and public entities engaged in financial intermediation such as monetary financial 
institutions (broadly equivalent to banks), investment funds, insurance corporations and 
pension funds. 
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US dollars by the end of period exchange rate. Basically, this is in line with 
procedure used in Allen et al. (2011) and Schoenmaker and Wagner (2011) for 
calculation of the outward and inward integration index.  
2 Results and Discussion 
In this section we discuss the results of the network analysis based on the data 
for EU13 countries in terms of claims of their banks’ foreign claims, i.e. country 
exposure and measurement of systemic risk. Before discussing the topological 
properties of the EU13 banking network let us briefly comment on the role of 
foreign claims in total financial assets of the domestic financial corporations 
sector measured by inward integration index (in-strength degree). If in 2007 the 
index values varied from 11 percent (United Kingdom) to 31 percent (Greece), 
the financial and consequently the debt crisis has caused a drop of its value to a 
minimum level of 5 percent (United Kingdom) and a maximum of 22 percent 
(Belgium). Apparently, even after the crisis the level of foreign exposure in the 
domestic banking sector of some countries represents a significant factor for 
assessment of its stability and supports the need for assessment of the systemic 
risk present in the entire EU13 banking network.16   
Table 1 reports the standardized Fagiolo Index values for period 2007 to 2012. In 
all years the computed indices are way over the zero threshold suggested by 
Fagiolo (2006) indicating that the matrix is directed, thus highly asymmetric. In 
economic terms, the high level of foreign claims floating from country  toward 
country  as is not reciprocated by backward flows in the form of foreign 
liabilities originating in country  measured as a proportion of domestic financial 
assets. 
Table 1 Fagiolo Symmetry Measure of the EU13 Banking Network  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Fagiolo Index 18.479 20.316 22.083 20.524 20.864 20.181 
Source: Author's computation 
Turning to the development over time, the highest level of asymmetry was 
achieved in year 2009 with a subsequent decrease. Yet, the changes in the 
Fagiolo index over this relatively short period cannot be considered significant and 
are barely able to cover the fact that the relationship between domestic banking 
sectors in EU13 is highly asymmetric in terms of creditor-debtor position.   
Table 2 and Table 3 provide the summary of the in- and out-strength degree of 
the banking sectors in the EU13 banking network. The countries with the highest 
influence over the banking sector of their network partners are France and 
                                      
16 Dependency on foreign financing is even more visible in the case of new EU28 members, 
such as the Slovak or Czech Republic. Initial calculations suggest that the value of inward 
integration index for those countries fluctuates around 60 percent.  
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Germany followed by Netherland and UK (out-strength degree). On the other side 
stand countries such as Portugal, Belgium and Austria (in-strength degree) that 
play the role of the most exposed countries toward their foreign partners. 
Regarding the evolution over time, the significant drop in the in- as well as out-
strength degree signalizes substantial closing out of the foreign positions of 
network members. This tendency is the most visible in case of the PIIGS 
countries, such as Greece, Ireland or Italy (in-strength degree) where the debt 
crisis has led to fall in their dependency on the foreign banking sector, on one 
hand, but resulted in higher dependency on the international institutions 
(“Troika”) on the other hand.  
Belgium, as the representative country of the Western developed economies, 
proves to be a special case due to the problems of domestic banking sector 
caused by the financial crisis in 2008. While the dependency of the domestic 
banking sector had increased to unprecedented levels (in-strength degree, 2009), 
the foreign creditor position of the domestic banking sector was hit severely and 
reached its bottom (out-strength degree, 2012).  
The visualization of these tendencies is provided by Figure 2. As apparent from 
the directed networks for years 2007 and 2012 the overall structure of the 
network remains almost untouched by the financial crisis; it is the overall 
strength of connections that was hit the most severely by the crisis and not the 
distribution. 
Figure 2 EU13 Banking Network by Out-Strength Degree in Year 2007 (left 
figure) and in Year 2012 (right figure) in directed weighted network 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
Note: The darker the color of the connecting edge between two nodes the stronger the 
connection between those nodes in comparison to the strength of the other edges. It is not 
possible to compare the strength of a particular connecting edge between the same two 
nodes (e.g. France and Italy) for different years (2007 and 2012) as both figures were 
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adjusted in a way to make the strongest connections visible while keeping the appropriate 
relative distances.     
Another piece of the EU13 banking network puzzle is visually presented by Figure 
2. The banking system is not only centralized but also highly asymmetric with 
some countries serving as leaders and some as followers. This leads to the 
structure characterized by one almost separated cluster (Denmark -> Sweden), 
one chainlike hybrid serving as a central hub of the entire financial structure 
(Netherlands -> Belgium <- France; France -> Italy -> Austria) one highly 
interlinked cluster-like structure (Netherlands -> Belgium) connected to the 
central hub, three countries connected predominantly in one-way direction to the 
central hub (Portugal, Spain, Greece) and the United Kingdom loosely connected 
to Ireland, then to other countries. As the overall structure of the network shows 
the geographical distances linked to other cultural and social factors clearly play a 
significant role in determining the strength of the linkages in the EU13 banking 
network. 
Let us now focus our attention on the properties of the EU13 banking network in 
terms of its heterogeneity. Even though the absolute changes in the in- and out-
strength degrees, thus the foreign exposure, are substantial the distribution of 
power remains relatively constant with slow upward trend towards more 
concentration in both in- and out-strength degree. For this reason we do not 
report the evolution of the HHI indices over time but only their 6-year averages.17 
As apparent from the results presented in Table 5, to countries with highest 
concentration of their dependency (in-strength degree) or their power (out-
strength degree) belong Sweden, Denmark, Spain and Italy followed by Austria 
and Belgium. Countries that are able to distribute their foreign exposure the most 
heterogeneously are Germany, UK, Ireland and France.  
                                      
17 One exception to this rule is Denmark where the concentration in the in-strength degree 
has almost doubled to 0.567 over the last six years. 
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Table 2 In-Strength Degree of the EU13 Banking Network Nodes 
 Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherland Portugal Spain Sweden UK 
2007 24.729 19.396 14.068 9.224 9.608 31.712 18.993 22.264 11.140 27.394 20.653 10.295 10.846 
2008 24.009 19.550 11.637 8.071 9.080 28.001 17.872 20.373 8.617 27.185 19.943 11.000 7.298 
2009 21.263 27.151 13.375 6.887 8.403 25.649 15.195 18.526 7.457 27.346 18.148 9.927 7.268 
2010 18.353 22.236 13.105 6.709 8.234 18.686 11.304 14.569 7.353 22.731 14.924 8.204 6.074 
2011 17.654 21.965 13.114 6.850 7.271 16.876 9.967 12.152 7.170 21.872 12.390 7.670 5.129 
2012 17.328 21.910 12.983 5.954 7.437 8.098 7.960 11.080 7.516 18.823 10.631 7.978 5.156 
Source: Author's computation 
 
Table 3 Out-Strength Degree of the EU13 Banking Network Nodes 
 Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherland Portugal Spain Sweden UK 
2007 3.660 16.019 5.754 46.257 54.746 0.158 8.716 18.347 26.961 2.578 15.726 8.758 22.641 
2008 3.126 11.324 6.837 46.057 49.878 0.122 7.005 19.169 21.837 2.688 15.316 7.691 21.588 
2009 3.222 5.102 5.127 56.777 45.961 0.296 6.155 15.352 19.166 3.154 15.540 9.126 21.615 
2010 2.375 4.063 4.511 42.012 38.911 0.237 3.157 13.472 14.649 3.128 14.488 10.068 21.416 
2011 1.955 2.993 4.176 38.314 34.424 0.222 0.928 13.032 14.089 2.651 14.659 11.426 21.212 
2012 1.389 2.069 4.174 31.579 30.779 0.262 0.755 11.932 13.632 2.252 14.281 11.049 18.703 
    Source: Author's computation 
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Table 4 Dependency Measure of the EU13 Banking Network Nodes (average, 2007-2012) 
 Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherland Portugal Spain Sweden UK 
Austria 0.00 0.16 0.02 2.49 51.03 0.40 0.16 74.37 0.31 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.38 
Belgium : 0.00 0.02 107.53 3.14 1.44 1.78 0.07 34.40 0.43 0.07 0.01 1.52 
Denmark : : 0.00 0.79 4.80 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.01 21.39 0.26 
France : : : 0.00 0.08 77.55 1.99 61.36 0.85 13.68 12.28 0.78 1.72 
Germany : : : : 0.00 33.33 13.30 2.06 0.88 23.77 21.58 3.33 1.02 
Greece : : : : : 0.00 0.92 0.84 3.19 1.61 0.02 0.01 3.66 
Ireland : : : : : : 0.00 0.10 0.39 0.16 0.05 0.03 12.73 
Italy : : : : : : : 0.00 1.42 0.36 0.03 0.01 1.24 
Netherlands : : : : : : : : 0.00 1.27 3.92 0.17 1.39 
Portugal : : : : : : : : : 0.00 90.80 0.00 6.80 
Spain : : : : : : : : : : 0.00 0.00 1.27 
Sweden : : : : : : : : : : : 0.00 0.69 
UK : : : : : : : : : : : : 0.00 
Source: Author's computation 
Note: The light-grey highlighted cells are assigned to the countries listed in the rows that are in a strong servant position of the “master-servant” relationship. The black 
highlighted cells are assigned to the countries listed in the rows that are in a strong master position of the “master-servant” relationship. 
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Table 5 HHI Index for the In-Strength Degree and Out-Strength Degree of the 
EU13 Banking Network Nodes (average, 2007-2012) 
 Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland 
In-
Strength 
Degree 
0.332 0.337 0.435 0.221 0.168 0.261 0.212 
Out-
Strength 
Degree 
0.126 0.139 0.625 0.163 0.105 0.156 0.172 
 Italy Netherland Portugal Spain Sweden UK  
In-
Strength 
Degree 
0.315 0.209 0.265 0.197 0.275 0.179  
Out-
Strength 
Degree 
0.383 0.200 0.294 0.475 0.689 0.115  
Source: Author's computation 
Interestingly, the countries with a highest in-strength degree are generally those 
countries that report the highest concentration of their foreign exposures, with 
Denmark as an exception due to its mutual interdependence with the Swedish 
banking system. On the other hand, the more powerful the domestic banking 
sector in terms of higher value of out-strength degree the more equally 
distributed its foreign claims across the dependent countries, in general. Thus, 
the highly exposed countries are usually dependent on a small number of major 
creditors while creditor countries tend to spread their power over dependent 
countries more equally (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Relationship between HHI index (y-axis) and in-strength (left figure)  
or out-strength degree (right figure), average 2007-2012 
Source: Author's computation 
Theoretically, this particular structure of the network might lead to the following 
scenario in case of a directed attack on some of the financial hubs – the greater 
equality in distribution in countries with high out-strength degree means that the 
shock is being transmitted to all links connected to the hub more or less equally 
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(risk-sharing). The countries entering the network in the “servant” position 
connected to the hub directed by an attack, on the other hand, serve as a 
receiver of their portion of risk, which, in relative terms, might cripple their 
domestic system if their exposure toward foreign partners is high.       
Figure 3 EU13 Banking Network by Dependency Measure in Year 2012 
 
Source: Author's computation 
The structure of the network in terms of the dependency ratio is presented in 
Table 4 and Figure 3. The most uneven relationship between countries is visible 
between following partners: Denmark -> Sweden, Spain -> Portugal; Netherlands 
-> Belgium <- France, France -> Italy -> Austria; Germany -> Greece <- France. 
The potential implications of this uneven relationship will be discussed in the 
following part of the paper. 
To sum our results up, at this point the existing structure of the EU13 banking 
network shows signs of robust, yet fragile characteristics with “master-servant” 
relationships present. Additionally, homophily (i.e. clustering on common 
characteristics) tends to be present as countries similar in cultural characteristics 
and close to each other in geographical terms are likely to form cluster-like 
structure.  
2.1 European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
As one part of the solution to the European financial and debt crisis, the European 
Commission’s proposal from 12 September, 2012 assigns the European Central 
Bank (ECB) new banking supervision tasks over the eurozone area’s bank 
network. The Single Supervisory Mechanism represents the first pillar of the 
European Banking Union’s three-pillar system that creates supranational 
supervisory architecture for common bank supervision in the EU, with ECB given 
the final supervisory power and national supervisors providing supporting roles.  
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Five basic conditions are given as the borderline between national and 
supranational jurisdiction: (1) the value of bank assets exceeds € 30 billions (the 
size criterion), (2) the value of bank assets exceeds both € 5 billions and 20% of 
the GDP of the member state in which it is located (the economic importance 
criterion), (3) the bank has large cross-border activities (cross-border activities 
criterion), (4) the bank receives assistance from a eurozone bailout fund (direct 
public financial assistance criterion), (5) the bank is among the three most 
significant banks of the country in which is located. These conditions are non-
excludable and the bank can assume role of supervised entity under the ECB 
supervision on the basis of any of the conditions (ECB, 2014, Article 39). 
Only the member states of the eurozone are obliged to follow the SSM scheme 
and become the members of the newly established European Banking Union. The 
non-eurozone member countries may enter and freely exit “close cooperation 
agreement” procedure. In that case the countries will act as full members of the 
SSM and will be obliged to all rights and responsibilities. 
As our paper predominantly deals with the issue of bank cross-border exposures 
in the following text we discuss the criterion (3) in a more detailed way.  
By the Article 59 (ECB, 2014, §1-3) the supervised group may be considered 
significant by the ECB on the basis of cross-border activities only when parent 
undertaking of a supervised group has established subsidiaries, which are 
themselves credit institutions, in more than one other participating Member 
State.  
The supervised group is defined as a group (ECB, 2014, Article 6, §21: (a) whose 
parent undertaking is a credit institution or financial holding company that has its 
head office in a participating Member State; (b) a group whose parent 
undertaking is a mixed financial holding company that has its head office in a 
participating Member State, provided that the coordinator of the financial 
conglomerate, within the meaning of Directive 2002/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1) of the Council, is an authority competent 
for the supervision of credit institutions and is also the coordinator in its function 
as supervisor of credit institutions; (c) supervised entities each with their head 
office in the same participating Member State provided that they are permanently 
affiliated to a central body which supervises them under the conditions laid down 
in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and which is established in the same 
participating Member State. 
A supervised group may be considered significant by the ECB on the basis of its 
cross-border activities only if the total value of its assets exceeds EUR 5 billion 
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and: (a) the ratio of its cross-border assets to its total assets is above 20 %; or 
(b) the ratio of its cross-border liabilities to its total liabilities is above 20 %. 
The definition of the cross-border assets and liabilities are specified in Article 60 
(ECB, 2014, §1-2). Cross-border assets’, in the context of a supervised group, 
means the part of the total  assets in respect of which the counterparty is a credit 
institution or other legal or natural person located in a participating Member State 
other than the Member State in which the parent undertaking of the relevant 
supervised group has its head office. Cross-border liabilities’, in the context of a 
supervised group, means the part of the total liabilities in respect of which the 
counterparty is a credit institution or other legal or natural person located in a 
participating Member State other than the Member State in which the parent 
undertaking of the relevant supervised group has its head office. 
The third criterion in the SSM mechanism is related to the cross-border activity of 
a banking entity that is subject to international jurisdiction. As we show the 
cross-border banking in a narrower sense and foreign banking in a broader sense 
represent an integral part of the European banking network which is reflected by 
inclusion of the cross-border activity criterion into the assessment of systemically 
important banking institutions (groups).  
From the perspective of the EU13 banking network the network can be 
characterized by a higher level of clustering on a country level that may have a 
potential impact on the systemic risk of the banking sector on an international 
level. The one country from the EU13 group that is likely to stay outside of the 
SSM mechanism is the United Kingdom. This decision is understandable once we 
recall that the UK scores very low in in-strength degree which only reflects the 
low exposure of the UK banking system towards the other members of the EU13 
in relative terms. Additionally, the UK banking system is the one with the most 
heterogeneously distributed claims and liabilities against the EU13 banking 
network which is likely to positively affect its robustness. The costs related to the 
single supervisory mechanism imposed by the ECB are thus likely to be 
considered inappropriate from the perspective of the UK policy makers. 
Interestingly, as the UK banking system is marked by the relative high out-
strength degree which, economically speaking, means that the UK banks own a 
relatively significant portion of the EU13 banking network, the establishment of 
the SSM mechanism might increase the safety of the UK exposure without 
bearing the costs associated with the regulatory change.  
Sweden is the second country after the UK that does not plan to enter the SSM 
mechanism. Once again as in the case of the United Kingdom the Swedish 
banking system is primarily oriented on investing in its closest neighbor – 
Denmark and its exposure towards other countries is relatively low. By Denmark 
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entering the SSM mechanism18 the Swedish banking system might indirectly 
profit from common supervision without giving up national supervisory power.19    
The highly asymmetric EU13 banking network supports the need for a common 
supervisory mechanism procedure as the domestic banking sectors of highly 
dependent countries are likely to be hit most severely once a liquidity shortage 
occurs on international level. In order to avoid the “cut and run” behavior of the 
owners of foreign capital (Allen et al., 2011) the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
can serve as a stabilizing component to prevent such behavior.  
Lastly, due to the uncertain times ruling over the last five years foreign banking 
has been significantly reduced, as our numbers suggest. Allen et al. (2011) and 
Schoenmaker and Wagner (2013) argue that cross-border banking can yield 
significant gains from international diversification. The SSM procedure can 
indirectly affect decisions of the banking institutions to reestablish channels of 
international capital flows that have been previously closed due to the financial 
crisis or to create the new ones which could lead to a more stable and less 
asymmetric banking network.  
Conclusions 
This paper investigates the properties of the EU13 banking network in terms of 
foreign claims exposures in light of the currently established Single Supervisory 
Mechanism.  
The banking network of the EU13 economic space can be characterized as highly 
asymmetric with tendency to create clusters based on geographic distance and 
cultural and social similarities. Too-interconnected-to-fail issue is also present in 
the EU13 economic space that forms the network structure characterized by some 
countries serving as the financial hubs and others as the dependent entities. 
Additionally, countries with a highest in-strength degree (Portugal, Belgium, 
Austria) report the highest concentration of their foreign exposures, in general. 
On the other hand, the more powerful the domestic banking sector in terms of 
higher value of out-strength degree (France and Germany) the more equally 
distributed its foreign claims across the dependent countries. Thus, the highly 
exposed countries are usually dependent on a small number of major creditors 
                                      
18 Even though Denmark does not belong to the Eurozone which means it is not obliged to 
participate on the SSM scheme some statements of official authorities might indicate that 
the country is actively considering its joining. Currently, Denmark is expected to become a 
next “close-cooperating” country along with Romania and Bulgaria.  
19 Assuming that the SSM will increase safety of the banking system of those countries 
included into this mechanism. Some authors argue that staying out of the SSM system 
might bring competitive disadvantage for the domestic banking sector and branches of 
banks not under the SSM supervision. If supervision by the ECB is considered as an 
important guarantee of soundness of banks, staying out might imply higher financing costs 
(Darvas and Wolff 2013).  
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while creditor countries tend to spread their power over dependent countries 
more equally. Due to the financial and debt crisis in Europe, the total exposure 
measured by the share of foreign claims on total domestic financial asset of 
financial corporations sector has significantly decreased. 
One supervisory initiative adopted at the international level directing the TITF 
issue from the top level is the Single Supervisory Mechanism. From the network 
analysis perspective, the Single Supervisory Mechanism can serve as a stabilizing 
mechanism that ensures that the countries in dependent position will be less 
exposed to the possible “cut and run” behavior. Two countries from our dataset 
have so far adopted “wait and see” policy while rejecting the joining of the SSM 
system, namely United Kingdom and Sweden. From the European banking 
network perspective, this decision might be justifiable looking at the level and 
distribution of exposure of their domestic banking system towards participating 
countries. While not bearing the administrative costs related to the active 
participation in the SSM and not suffering the loss of supervision authority over 
the domestic banking sector, these countries might enjoy positive externalities 
coming from the decrease in systemic risk embedded in the banking sector 
network of their key partner countries. On top of that the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism could encourage the banking sector to restore foreign financing lost 
due to the financial and debt crisis in order to earn possible benefits from 
international diversification.   
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